UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

2-21-2018

Hodge for and on behalf of Welch v. Waggoner Respondent's Brief
Dckt. 45336

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs

Recommended Citation
"Hodge for and on behalf of Welch v. Waggoner Respondent's Brief Dckt. 45336" (2018). Idaho Supreme
Court Records & Briefs, All. 7198.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/7198

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by
an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

JIM HODGE, as Personal Representative of the
Estate of PAUL ROBERT WELCH, (deceased),
Interpleacler-Defendant/
Crossclaimant/Appellant,

Supreme Court Docket No. 45336-2017
Twin Falls County Case No. CV42-15-3687

v.
KATHY WAGGONER and TERESA VITEK,
Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of
BARBARA SUE CHITWOOD, (deceased),
Interpleader-Defendants/
Crossdefendants/Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
In and for the County of Twin Falls
The Honorable Randy J. Stoker, District Judge, Presiding

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS

Kirk A. Melton ISB# 8707
Worst, Fitzgerald & Stover, PLLC
905 Shoshone Street North
PO Box 1428
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1428

John B. Lothspeich ISB# 4221
Williams, Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP
153 East Main Street
PO Box 168
Jerome, Idaho 83338-0168

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................................................... I

A. Nature of the Case ....................................................................................................................... I
B. Course of Proceedings ............................................................................................................. ... 1

C. Statement of Facts ...................................................................................................................... 1-4
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL ................................................................................................................ 4
A. The trial court was required to and correct in finding Welch a slayer
B. The trial court correctly intemreted and applied "the Slayer Statute"
C. The trial court correctly awarded the joint accounts to Chitwood
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW ....................................................................................................... 4
IV. ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................................... 5-15

A. The Trial Court was Required to and Correct in Finding Welch a Slayer.............................. 5-6
B. The Trial Court Correctly Interpreted and Applied "The Slayer Statute"............................ 7-15
1) The accounts, by Welch's own volition, were made joint accounts with right of
survivorship, providing an interest to Chitwood............................................................... 10
2) The "Slayer Statute" applies to the accounts ........................................................... 10-15
C. The Trial Court Correctly Awarded the Joint Account to Chitwood .................................. 13-15

V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................................... 15
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ...................................................................................................... 16

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF Page I i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Barlow's Inc. vs Bannock Cleaning, Corp., 103 Idaho 310,647 P.2d 766 (1982) ......................... 8
Brummett vs. Ediger, 106,724,682 P.2d 1271 (1984) ...................................................................5
Edmondson vs. Shearer Lumber Products, 139 Idaho 172, 75 P.3d 733 (2003) ........................... 13
. Edmonson vs. Shearer Lumber Products, 139 Idaho 172, 75 P.3d 733 (2003) ............................... 8
Estate ofBecker vs. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 96 P.3d 623 (2004) ............................................... .4
Estate o/Cox, 141 Montana 583,380 P.2d 584 (1963) ................................................................. 12
Harwood vs. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 39 P.2d 617 (2001) .............................................................. 5
Ibid at30,31,810 ......................................................................................................................... 12
Ibid. at 313, 769 ............................................................................................................................... 8
Id at 617, 677 ................................................................................................................................... 5
Just 's, Inc. vs Arrington Construction Co., Inc., 99 Idaho 462, 583 P .2d 997 (1978) .................... 8
Mapp vs Ohio, 376 US 643 (1961) ..................................................................................................7
Mason vs. Tucker and Associates, 125 Idaho 429,871 P.2d 846 (Ct. App 1994) .......................... 8
R. Martineau, Considering New Issues on Appeal: the General Rule and the Gorilla Rule, 40
Vanderbilt Law Review 1023 (1987) .......................................................................................... 7

Sikora vs. Sikora, 160 Montana 27,499 P.2d 808 (1972) ............................................................. 12
Singleton vs. Wulff, 428 US 106, 121 (1976) .................................................................................. 7
Statutes
Idaho Code §§15-2-803(c) and (h) .................................................................................................. 4
Idaho Code §15-2-803 ............................................................................................................... 1, 11
Idaho Code §15-2-803(a)(2) .......................................................................................................... 11
Idaho Code § 15-2-803(a)(3) ...................................................................................................... 4, 12

Idah.o Code §15-2-803(b) ................................................................................................................ 3
Idaho Code §15-2-803{g) ................................................................................................................ 2
Idaho Code §15-2-803(h) .............................................................................................................. 11

Idaho Code §l 5-2-803{n) ........................................................................................................ 10, 13
Idah.o Code §55-105 ...................................................................................................................... 11
Idaho Code §73-113 ........................................................................................................................ 9

Other Authorities
48ACJS Joint Tenancy §3 ............................................................................................................. 12
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. West Publishing Co., 1979 p. 201.. ........................................... .14
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. West Publishing Co., 1979 p. 529 .............................................. 10
Holman vs. Johnson, lKOWP 341,343 (1775) ............................................................................ 10
Section 49-109, R.C.M. 1947 ........................................................................................................ 12
Silas A. Harris, What is a cause of action? California Law Review Vol. 16 Issue 6
Article 1 p.461 (1928) ................................................................................................................ 14

Rules
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56 ....................................................................................................9
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) ................................................................................................9

IRCP 56(c) ....................................................................................................................................... 8

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF Page I ii

I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal of the trial court's decision and judgment regarding application ofldaho
Code §15-2-803 (the "Slayer Statute") to joint bank accounts designated with right of survivorship
deposited with the court by Farmers Bank. Jimmie Hodge as Guardian of Paul Welch ("Welch"),
claimed the funds were solely deposited by Welch and remained his regardless of whether Welch
murdered Barbara Sue Chitwood, the joint account holder. The Estate of Barbara Sue Chitwood
("Chitwood") claimed that Idaho Code §15-2-803 (the "Slayer Statute") was applicable and
mandating ownership of the accounts to her Estate due to Welch murdering her and causing her
wrongful death.

B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Farmers Bank deposited funds from two (2) joint accounts with right of survivorship with
the district court in interpleader. Welch and Chitwood filed their Answers, neither of which
demanded a jury trial. Welch filed an initial Motion for Summary Judgment, which the court
decided under an application of the "Slayer Statute", Idaho Code §15-2-803. The court also stayed
the proceedings pending the outcome of Welch's criminal case in which he had been indicted for
the murder of Chitwood. Welch was later deemed incapacitated. A Guardian was appointed on his
behalf. Welch's Guardian filed a second Motion for Summary Judgment, which was denied and
the court ordered the joint accounts awarded to Chitwood. This appeal then ensued. Welch has
since died and has Estate has been substituted in as the proper party.

C. STATEMENTOFFACTS
Welch and Chitwood were a couple, having begun living together in 2005. R483. On June
11, 2013, Welch added Chitwood to checking and savings accounts at Farmers Bank, establishing
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each individually as "joint account with right of survivorship". R.483. The checking account had
previously been in the names of Welch and his wife, Lillian, who died in 2012. The savings account
had been opened in July of 2012, initially listing Chitwood as POD. R.483. On June 11, 2013, both
Welch and Chitwood signed signature cards for these joint accounts. R.483, 49, 51. Regarding
ownership of account, other options available, but not chosen were: Individual; Joint-No
Survivorship; Community Property Account-No Survivorship; and Trust. R.49, 51. Both Welch
and Chitwood signed both signature cards for both accounts, explicitly choosing "Joint-With
Survivorship". R.49, 51. Chitwood wrote checks on the checking account. R.205, 217.
Welch murdered Chitwood on August 21, 2015. R.420, 421, 484. After Chitwood's
murder, the Co-Personal Representatives of the Chitwood Estate sought to transfer the funds for
the accounts to the estate. R.350-351. Farmers Bank was alerted as to the accounts being in dispute
and deposited the funds with the court, initiating the interpleader action. R.11-15. In its answer,
Chitwood asserted the "Slayer Statue", Idaho Code §15-2-803, and claimed Welch was not entitled
to the joint accounts. R.20-21. Welch filed an initial Motion for Summary Judgment, claiming he
contributed all monies to the joint accounts and that the "Slayer Statute" did not apply. R.35-39.
Chitwood responded in asserting broad application of the "Slayer Statute" and specifically
applying Idaho Code §15-2-803(g). R.232-247.
At hearing, the court noted that Chitwood had an interest in the "account", and that the
parties created a joint account. (Tr. p. 14, lines 9-10, 20-21 ). Significant argument and colloquy
between court and counsel ensued discussing the application of the "Slayer Statute". (Tr. pp. 1443). At the time of argument, Welch was awaiting trial on an indictment of first degree murder.
(Tr. p. 49, lines 19-24, p. 50, lines 1-2). The court referenced application of the "Slayer Statute"
and denied the Motion for Summary Judgment. (Tr. p. 51, lines 3-9). The case was then stayed
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pending the outcome of Welch's criminal trial. Subsequent thereafter, Welch was found
incapacitated and a Guardian appointed. R.310.
Welch filed another Motion for Summary Judgment. Welch, again, argued that Chitwood
had no interest in the accounts since Welch contributed all of the funds and did not address whether
Welch was a slayer. R.329-330. Chitwood responded that Welch murdered Chitwood and that the
"Slayer Statute" was applicable to the accounts, under broad application. R.448-449. Chitwood
argued the application of Idaho Code §15-2-803(b), which states:
"No slayer shall, in any way, acquire any property or receive and benefit as a result
of the death of the decedent."
This is a broad statement of the legislative intent under the "Slayer Statute". At hearing, the court
noted that the "Slayer Statute" had to be considered, as raised by the defense. The court indicated
that any part of the "Slayer Statute" is therefore applicable. (Tr. p. 65, lines 7-12). The court
correctly identified the accounts as property and property rights attendant with the account. (Tr.
p.74, lines 11-22). The court identified the "Slayer Statute" provisions to include any real or
personal property and any rights therein. The court then indicated that the right of survivorship
was a property interest of Chitwood in the accounts. (Tr. p. 75, lines 9-16).
The court also determined that Welch took Chitwood's life. (Tr. p. 78, lines 8-14). R.490491. By so doing, Welch extinguished Chitwood's right of survivorship in the accounts. (Tr. p. 78,
lines 15-16). Welch acknowledged at hearing that the matter was set for court trial and that the
court was required to decide the case based upon the law. (Tr. p. 81, lines 1-6).
In its Memorandum Opinion on Motion for Summary Judgment, the court reviewed
whether Chitwood had any interest in the bank accounts. The court determined that the joint
accounts contained survivorship and "it is a basic rule of law that a right of survivorship is what
distinguishes a joint tenancy from other property interests''. R.486. The court noted that Welch
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focused solely on ownership of the funds in the accounts, as deposited by Welch, and Chitwood's
property interest in the accounts. R.487.
The court reviewed the meaning of "property" within the "Slayer Statute", Idaho Code
§15-2-803(a)(3). The court noted that Chitwood had a "bundle of rights" in property. First,
Chitwood could withdraw funds independent of Welch. Further, Chitwood's creditors could
garnish the accounts. Secondly, Chitwood had the right of survivorship. R.487. The court went on
to find that Welch intended Chitwood to have a survivorship interest in the funds. Having chosen
between options at account formation, Welch and Chitwood chose Joint-With Survivorship.
(R.488). On that basis, the court found a property interest of Chitwood in the accounts and that
Idaho Code §§15-2-803(c) and (h) were applicable to the accounts, awarding same to Chitwood's
Estate. R.491-493.

II.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

A. THE TRIAL COURT WAS REQUIRED TO AND CORRECT IN FINDING WELCH A
SLAYER.
B. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED AND APPLIED "THE SLAYER
STATUTE".
C. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED THE JOINT ACCOUNTS TO
CHITWOOD.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In appeal from an order of summary judgment, the standard of review is the same as the
standard of review used by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.
"All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party,
and all reasonable inferences that can drawn from the record are to be drawn in
favor of the non-moving party. Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings,
depositions and admission on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there's no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as matter of law." (Estate ofBecker vs. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 96
P.3d 623 (2004)).
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V.

ARGUMENT

A. THE TRIAL COURT WAS REQUIRED TO AND CORRECT IN FINDING

WELCH A SLAYER.
Welch contends that the trial court erred in making the finding that Welch caused the death
of Chitwood. Welch erroneously claims that the issue of whether or not Welch was a slayer was
not properly before the trial court. Welch makes the claim that in filing a motion for summary
judgment, the "Slayer Statute" was not properly before the court. However, the court and the
parties expansively discussed the "Slayer Statute" in the first motion for summary judgment.
Chitwood asserted application of the "Slayer Statute" in the answer filed at the
commencement of the interpleader action. Welch claims that issues not raised in a motion for
summary judgment may not be decided by the trial court in its ruling on summary judgment, citing

Harwood vs. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 39 P.2d 617 (2001). However, Harwood actually supports
the court's action in the instant matter. In Harwood, this court wrote:
"In this case, partial summary judgment was granted to Harwood, the non-moving
party. This court has determined "summary judgment may be rendered for any
party, not just the moving party, on any or all the causes of action involved, under
the Rule of Civil Procedure", thus allowing trial courts flexibility in determining
the form of relief granted in summary judgment orders." (Id at 617, 677).
"The district court may grant summary judgment to a non-moving party even if the
party has not filed its own motion with the court. A motion for summary judgment
allows the court to rule on the issues placed before it as a matter of law; the moving
party runs the risk that the court will find against it, as in this case." (Id at 617, 677;
see also Brummett vs. Ediger, 106,724,682 P.2d 1271 (1984)).
Welch maintains that, in his motion for summary judgment, the "Slayer Statute" did not
apply because the funds were owned by Welch, not Chitwood. Welch points out that nowhere in
its brief did he raise the issue whether or not he was a slayer as defined by the "Slayer Statute".
In its brief, Welch then claims "despite this fact, the trial court took it upon itself to make that
factual finding". (Appellant's Brief p.7). That is entirely wrong.
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In its answer and both responses to the motions for summary judgment, Chitwood
repeatedly indicated that the court was required to apply the "Slayer Statute" and ultimately
determine if it was applicable in a finding that Welch was indeed the slayer of Chitwood.
Welch erroneously claims that the trial court failed to recognize that the reason no evidence
to contradict the showing the evidence that Welch was a slayer was needed to be presented because
it wasn't raised for decision. This is nonsense. The application of the "Slayer Statute" was the
seminal issue as to the application of funds held in interpleader from the very outset of the case.
Welch then claims that had the trial court advised the parties it would be making a determination
regarding the slayer status of Welch, Welch would have had an opportunity to address the issue.
Welch was well advised as to the application of the "Slayer Statute" at the outset of the case and
upon the court's initial ruling in denying the initial motion for summary judgment.
Welch then requests that this Court remand the matter for purposes of having the factual
issue of whether Welch qualifies as slayer addressed by the trial court in what Welch deems a
"procedurally appropriate manner". (Appellant's Briefp.8). The procedurally appropriate manner
claimed, is supposedly that Welch be given notice of its application, which has been repeatedly
advanced by Chitwood from the outset. Further, Welch had the opportunity to rebut the evidence
of Chitwood's murder, but chose not to. Additionally, if the court grants the Motion to Augment

Record filed by Chitwood herein, Welch has already been adjudged causing the wrongful death of
Chitwood in the collateral action, Twin Falls County Case No. CV42-15-3921.
The court had the authority to apply the "Slayer Statute" and rule upon the issues placed
before it is a matter of law and determined the appropriate relief from the cause of action involved.
Welch, as moving party, ran the risk that the court would apply the "Slayer Statute" and rule upon
its effect upon the subject accounts. The trial court's ruling was entirely appropriate.
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B. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED AND APPLIED "THE
SLAYER STATUE".
Welch has steadfastly maintained that the "Slayer Statute" has no application. In its rulings
denying both motions for summary judgment, and ultimately awarding the accounts to Chitwood,
the trial court, as the trier of fact, correctly and expansively reviewed the application of the "Slayer
Statute".
Courts have occasionally been required to raise and decide issues sua sponte, in the interest
of justice. This has applied both at the trial and appellate levels. Professor Robert Martineau
provided a metaphor for sua sponte appellate decision making as follows:
"There's a general rule that appellate courts should not decide issues not raised by
the parties. And then, there's the exception, known as the "gorilla rule", that is
"unless they do". Because, the 800 pound gorilla may sit wherever it wants."
(R. Martineau, Considering New Issues on Appeal: the General Rule and the
Gorilla Rule, 40 Vanderbilt Law Review 1023 (1987)).
The United States Supreme Court has not adopted a general rule regarding sua sponte
decision making on the appellate level. In Singleton vs. Wulff, 428 US 106, 121 (1976), the court
wrote:
"The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on
appeal is one left primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeal, to be exercised
on the facts of individual cases. We announce no general rule."
Notably, a landmark Supreme Court case, Mapp vs Ohio, 376 US 643 (1961), went well
outside the bounds of general review whereas the Supreme Court overruled earlier precedent and
applied the 4th Amendment Exclusionary Rule to the states without briefing or hearing arguments
on that issue. That landmark case has expansive application under 4th Amendment Constitutional
Law on a daily basis in the courts even today.
The above is referenced only to emphasize that courts, at both the trial court and appellate
level have properly raised issues, sua sponte, when justice so requires. Therefore, the trial court
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here, sua sponte, included a review of a section of an applicable statute. This is allowable. In Idaho,
this court has ruled that at summary judgment stage, a cause of action not raised in party's
pleadings may not be considered on summary judgment nor may it be considered for the first time
on appeal. (Edmonson vs. Shearer Lumber Products, 139 Idaho 172, 75 P.3d 733 (2003)).
However, a clear distinction here is not that the court, sua sponte, reviewed a cause of action not
raised, but application of provisions within a statute raised by Chitwood in reference to the seminal
issue of application of the "Slayer Statute".
In Barlow's Inc. vs Bannock Cleaning, Corp., 103 Idaho 310, 647 P.2d 766 (1982), this
court writes:
"A motion for summary judgment urges the trial court hold that there are no
genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. (IRCP 56(c)). However, if the court determines, after hearing, that
no genuine issues of material fact exists, the court may enter judgment for the
parties it deems entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Thus, in appropriate
circumstances, the court is authorized to enter summary judgment in favor of nonmoving parties." (Ibid. at 313, 769).
Additionally, this court has ruled that where a motion to dismiss is transformed into a motion for
summary judgment, where the parties submitted affidavits considered by the district court, and
although plaintiff did not move for summary judgment, the district court was nonetheless
empowered to grant it. (Just's, Inc. vs Arrington Construction Co., Inc., 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d
997 (1978)). Clearly, the trial court was authorized to rule as it did.
Here, Welch has been alerted to the existence of the application of the "Slayer Statute"
from the answer filed by Chitwood at the onset of the case. R.20-23. In the court's first denial of
Welch's motion for summary judgment, the "Slayer Statute's" application was addressed
expansively. In Mason vs. Tucker and Associates, 125 Idaho 429, 871 P.2d 846 (Ct. App 1994),
this court wrote:
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"The district court's error in granting summary judgment based upon rationales not
raised by the motion does not necessarily require reversal. If the district court's
order for summary judgment was correct, though based upon an inappropriate
theory, this court will affirm upon the correct theory. (Cites omitted). Therefore, we
will consider whether summary judgment dismissing plaintifrs claims should be
affirmed on the statute oflimitation grounds advanced by the defendants below."
On that basis, if the trial court correctly applied the "Slayer Statute", it should be affirmed.
Though differing subsections of the slayer statue were applied, Welch had more than adequate
notice to address all aspects of the "Slayer Statute". The trial court did not err in interpreting the
"Slayer Statute". Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56 also indicates:
"(c) Procedures.
(3) Materials Not Cited. The court need consider only the cited materials,
but it may consider other material in the record."
In addition, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e). Failing to Properly Support or Address a
Fact, indicates:
"If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address
another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may,:
(4) issue any other appropriate order."
This explicitly allows the trial court to determine the facts and law supported by the
evidence at summary judgment, and issue an appropriate order, which occurred here. Obviously,
this required the trial court to determine the "!ID!", and interpret the "Slayer Statute" as it applied
to the facts. The court determined that Welch was a slayer. The court applied the "Slayer Statute"
to the accounts. The court determined whether or not Chitwood had "any" interest in the accounts
and found that she did thereby awarding the accounts to her. This is required under the law.
Welch cites Idaho Code §73-113 in reference to statutory construction. The district court
carefully and thoroughly reviewed the "Slayer Statute", both at oral argument and in its written
decision in applying its plain, usual and ordinary meaning.
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1) The accounts, by Welch's own volition, were made joint accounts with right of
survivorship, providing an interest to Chitwood.

In its brief, Welch points out that the court recognized Welch contributed the funds to the
joint accounts. However, Welch is not cognizant that Chitwood had an interest in the accounts
when the election was made by Welch and jointly with Chitwood to designate the accounts
ownership as joint-with survivorship. Welch, on his own volition, added Chitwood to the accounts
and specifically chose the manner of the accounts as joint-with survivorship.
2) The "Slayer Statute" applies to the accounts.

Welch argues that the "Slayer Statute" is to prohibit slayers from receiving benefits from
causing the death of another. Idaho Code §15-2-803(n) states:
"This section shall not be considered penal in nature, but shall be construed
broadly in order effect the policy of this state that no person shall be allowed
to profit by his own wrong, wherever committed." (Emphasis added).

Under its plain and ordinary meaning, the application of the "Slayer Statute" is not intended
to fine an individual for their crime or offense. However, broad construction is required to ensure
that the broad public policy is applied that an individual should not profit by their wrongdoing.
This is no transient notion but an ancient one. The genesis of the "Slayer Statute" can be traced
back to the ancient maxim ex turpi causa non oritu actio:
"Out of base [illegal or immoral], consideration, an action cannot arise." (Black's
Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. West Publishing Co., 1979 p. 529)
As Lord Mansfield wrote in Holman vs. Johnson, IKOWP 341,343 (1775):
"If, from the plaintiff's own standing or otherwise, there the cause of action appears
to rise ex turpi causa, or the transgression of a positive law of this country, the court
says he has no right to be assisted. It is upon that ground that the court goes; not for
the sake of the defendant, but because they will lend their aide to such a plaintiff."

This maxim is implicitly applied in Idaho "Slayer Statue" to mandate that the broad public policy
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is followed to ensure that a person does not profit by his own wrongdoing, wherever committed.
Under a broad analysis of the "Slayer Statute", it is undisputed that Welch, having
previously been the account holder, elected to place Chitwood on the accounts as a joint owner
with survivorship. The trial court then was required, having found that the statute applied because
of the murder of Chitwood by Welch, in reviewing Idaho Code §15-2-803, to determine what the
effect of the homicide allowed on the distribution of the accounts under a broad policy analysis.
In applying Idaho Code § 15-2-803(a)(2), the court correctly identified property as:
"Any real and personal property and any right or interest therein". R.487.
(Emphasis added).
The trial court then ruled that (h) and (c) of the "Slayer Statute" are applicable to the
account funds. Subsection (h) applies to:
"Any contingent remainder or executory or other future interest held by the slayer,
subject to become vested in him or increased in any way for him upon the condition
of the death of the decedent." (Idaho Code §15-2-803(h)).
The statute continues:
"(l) If the interest would not have become vested or increased ifhe had predeceased
the decedent, he shall be deemed to have so predeceased the decedent." (Ibid).
A future interest "vests", when there is a person and being would have a right, defeasible
or indefeasible, to the immediate possession of the property upon the ceasing of the immediate or
precedent interest. (Idaho Code §55-105). R.491.
The trial court found that Welch had a future interest in these accounts-his own right of
survivorship. If Chitwood survived Welch, her right of survivorship would have become "vested".
On that basis, the court correctly found that Welch benefited as a result of murdering Chitwood,
which is not allowed under the "Slayer Statute". R.491, 492. The trial court then goes on in writing:
"Subsection (c) also applies. That section provides that a slayer "shall be deemed
to have predeceased the decedent as to property which would ... have been
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acquired ... under any agreement made with the decedent. (Emphasis added). Again,
"property" is defined very broadly as "any real or personal property" and "any right
or interest therein". (Idaho Code §15-2-803(a)(3) (Emphasis added). R.492.
The trial court's analysis of the "Slayer Statute" application was correct.
Survivorship is the distinctive characteristic or major incident of an estate in joint tenancy.
Indeed, at common law, survivorship was an inherent attribute of joint tenancies, and it existed
without any mention in the deed of conveyance. The incident of survivorship grows out of the
application of common law principles wholly independent of statute. Such right is viewed as
existing in a joint tenancy. (48ACJS Joint Tenancy §3). The trial court realized the significance of
the accounts themselves, 'joint-with survivorship". The trial court seized upon the "with
survivorship" meaning.
The trial court's finding, in applying the "Slayer Statute" in the instant case, has also been
found to be appropriately applied in other jurisdictions. In Sikora vs. Sikora, 160 Montana 27,499
P.2d 808 (1972), the court applied the same analysis to similar facts. In Sikora, the controlling
issue raised in the appeal is whether the surviving widow, who was guilty of voluntary
manslaughter of her husband, can share in the estate of her husband by the operation of the laws
of joint tenancy, etc. The court writes:
"The question of whether Mrs. Sikora may by right of survivorship take property
owned jointly by her husband and herself has already been settled in Montana. This
court held in Estate of Cox, 141 Montana 583,380 P.2d 584 (1963), that a joint
tenant, who had intentionally and wrongfully killed another joint tenant, was not
entitled to the survivorship share in the property. As a remedy in this type of
situation we held that constructive trust would be imposed on the property for the
benefit of the heirs of the deceased joint tenant. We based this decision on the
equitable principle that a wrongdoer may not benefit from his wrongful acts.
(Section 49-109, R.C.M. 1947). This same principle holds true in this case. The
laws governing joint tenancy will not be given a strict construction where the
demands of justice and public policy demand another." (Ibid at 30, 31, 810).
(Emphasis added).
Here, the "Slayer Statute" adopts the same public policy. As joint tenants of the accounts

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF Page 112

with right of survivorship, when Welch murdered Chitwood, he is not entitled to the survivorship
share of the property or the ownership of the accounts. That is consistent with the "broad
application required in Idaho's "Slayer Statute" to effect the public policy that:
" ... No person shall be allowed to profit by his own wrong, wherever committed."
(Idaho Code §15-2-803(n)).
The trial court noted this policy in the instant case, writing:
"When Welch killed Chitwood, he benefitted by ensuring that he would be the one
to acquire the funds in the account. Therefore, he "acquired" those funds under his
agreement with Chitwood. The slayer statute precludes that perverse result and
rightly so." R.493.
On that basis, the trial court correctly applied ''the Slayer Statute" as to the joint accounts
with survivorship and upheld the ancient public policy emblazoned in "the Slayer Statute".

C. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED THE JOINT ACCOUNTS
TO CHITWOOD.
Welch indicates that the trial court erred in awarding the accounts to Chitwood based upon
subsection (c) and (g) of"the Slayer Statute". 1
Chitwood had referenced subsection (c) and (g) as applicable. The trial court applied
subsection (c) and (h). Welch claims that the trial court could not consider bases not raised by
Chitwood. Welch argues that "a cause of action not raised in a party's pleadings may not be
considered on summary judgment". (Edmondson vs. Shearer Lumber Products, 139 Idaho 172, 75
P.3d 733 (2003)). (Emphasis added). Chitwood raised "the Slayer Statute'' in its pleadings (i.e.
Answer). R.20-22.
The "cause of action" in this case is the disputed ownership of funds deposited with the
trial court in interpleader. A "cause of action" is defined as:
"A situation or state of facts which would entitle party to sustain action and give
him right to seek a judicial remedy on his behalf." (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed.
1 Welch

is mistaken in his brief, as the trial court applied subsection (c) and (h) of"the Slayer Statute".
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West Publishing Co., 1979 p. 201).
Professor Silas A. Harris, University of Idaho, College of Law, provides an even better
explanation of a "cause of action" as follows:
"In every civil action the plaintiff is asking the sovereign power through its judicial

machinery to come to his aid and require certain conduct of the defendant. This
desired conduct is ordinarily designated as relief sought. This relief sought is given
only to those in whom the law recognizes a certain right thereto-a remedial right.
This remedial right is a creature of the law and arises out of some certain relation
of the parties and their conduct with reference thereto. If this is the essence of an
action, we should be able to find herein our cause of action; that is, those factors
which give cause for the state to act." (Emphasis added). (Silas A. Harris, What is
a cause of action? California Law Review Vol. 16 Issue 6 Article I p.461 ( 1928)).
In this matter, both parties were requesting the court, as the judicial machinery of the
sovereign power, to grant relief sought in the disputed accounts placed with the court in the
interpleader action. The trial court's application of subsection (c) and (h) of"the Slayer Statute" is
not a new "cause of action" unpled. The "Slayer Statute" is a creature of the law in which both
parties sought a remedial right. Ownership of the accounts was the cause of action. The trial court
recognized its role in having the ability and duty to apply, what the court felt the appropriate
subsections of "the Slayer Statute" were to determine ownership of the accounts. The trial court
wrote in footnote 3 of its Memorandum Opinion on Motion/or Summary Judgment, R491, as
follows:
"During oral argument concerns were expressed that subsection (h) was never
argued by the estate. While it is true that the estate did not specifically cite to
subsection (h), the ultimate question to be resolved by the court is which party can
have the property. The estate has clearly raised the slayer statute in response to
Welch's claim to the property. The estate also clearly argued that Welch intended
to give a joint tenancy and a right of survivorship of the funds to Chitwood.
Considering the procedural posture of the case, the state of the record, and that this
would eventually tried to this court, in the court's view it is obligated to evaluate
any portion of the slayer statute that could apply to the arguments made by the
estate."
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As previously referenced, the court had that ability and properly perfonned its duty herein.

It was not a separate cause of action but an appropriate action of the trial court to resolve the
disputes between the parties in applying the appropriate statute.

V.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth hereinabove, Chitwood respectfully requests that the court affirm
the Judgment of the trial coutt. Chitwood further requests that the court order attorneys' fees and
costs incurred from the appeal ensuing herein.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 20lh day of February, 2018.
Wi lliams, Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP
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